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Germany's Basic Law and the Use of Force
RUSSELL A. MILLER*

ABSTRACT

The German Basic Law's Regime for the use of force is evidence of
and an explanation for the deep difference between Germany and the
United States on security matters. It also might say something more
grand about the power of law to constrainforce.
INTRODUCTION

Among the German Basic Law's (Grundgesetz or constitution)
distinguishing features, and in light of its considerable success, there is
one thread in its remarkable tapestry that particularly merits further
attention. It is a matter of constitutional law with singular significance
for transatlantic affairs and is therefore especially worthy of recognition
in a "German-American Dialogue on NATO's 60th Anniversary."
Six decades after the founding of NATO, scholars are still debating
the roles that the United States and Germany should play in securing
the two nations' shared interests. On this issue there has been
disagreement and disappointment on both sides of the Atlantic, with the
United States generally pressing for the projection of force, and
Germany balking. These roles were popularly caricatured by Robert
Kagan in his essay Of Paradiseand Power, which he published in an
earlier and more strained part of this decade.1 Back then Kagan invoked
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law; CoEditor-in-Chief, German Law Journal (http://www.germanlawjournal.com); Co-author,
with Donald Kommers, of a treatise on German constitutional law. See DONALD P.
KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (3rd ed. forthcoming 2011). This essay was completed during my
tenure as a Fulbright Senior Scholar at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public
Law and Public International Law, Heidelberg, Germany (2009-10). Email:
millerra@wlu.edu.
1. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER (2003). For a number of critiques of
Kagan's claims, see the German Law Journal symposium issue "New Transatlantic
Tensions and the Kagan Phenomenon." Articles of particular relevance include Rebecca M.
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a tired clich6 from pop-psychology and declared that, "on major strategic
and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and
Europeans are from Venus."2 More recently, the headlines that followed
President Barack Obama's visit to Baden-Baden as part of the state
conference marking the sixtieth anniversary of NATO suggested that,
on the question of security, the United States and Germany are playing
to type. "Europeans offer few new troops for Afghanistan," the New York
Times trumpeted. 1Mr. Obama has been greeted warmly on a personal
level," the report said, "but his calls for a more lasting European troop
increase for Afghanistan were politely brushed aside." 3 President
Obama should not take this as a personal slight. After all, one of the
more entertaining moments in Oliver Stone's otherwise unremarkable
movie, W., depicted the forty-third President railing against "that kraut
Schr6der" because Chancellor Schrbder had refused to lead Germany
into the "coalition of the willing" that was being formed to execute
4
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
From a perspective informed by German constitutional
jurisprudence, this essay addresses this confounding facet of GermanAmerican relations, which is central to the viability and efficacy of
NATO today. It argues that modern Germany's deeply embedded
reticence toward the use of force, which consistently places it in conflict
with America's more muscular vision of trans-Atlanticism, has both
roots and expression in the Basic Law. It concludes by suggesting that
Germany's constitutional use-of-force regime does more than provide
insight into U.S. and German differences on matters of security, but
that the German constitution might have achieved something more
grand with its challenge to the persistent realist argument that force
cannot be constrained by law.

I. THE BASIC LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
The German people are distinctly keyed to law. It should come as no
surprise, therefore, that an examination of Germany's security policy

Bratspies, This Too Shall Pass:A Response to Kagan's Power and Weakness, 4 GERMAN
L.J. 879 (2003); Olaf Dilling, If I Had a Hammer - A Review of Kagan's Power and
Weakness, 4 GERMAN L.J. 963 (2003); Russell Miller, The Shared .Transatlantic
Jurisprudenceof Dignity, 4 GERMAN L.J. 925 (2003); Andreas Paulus, Antimonies of Power
and Law: A Comment on Robert Kagan, 4 GERMAN L.J. 871 (2003). These articles are
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.comindex.php?pageID=2&vol=4&no=9.
2. KAGAN, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Steven Erlanger & Helene Cooper, Europeans Offer Few New Troops for
Afghanistan,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at A6.
4. Tim Harper, W's Already Old in an Era that Deems Yesterday Historic, TORONTO
STAR, Oct. 18, 2008, availableat http://www.thestar.com/World/Columnist/article/519763.
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also might effectively begin with the law. The Roman historian Tacitus
remarked that Rome learned more from the northern Germanic tribes
than from any of the other barbarians on the messy margin of the
Empire. He singled out the Germans' well-developed system of
customary law for praise. It was offset, perhaps, by their quirky
insistence on appearing at any gathering fully armed and by an
awkward penchant for blurting out everything on their mind straight
away.5 Others have remarked that while the French were storming the
Bastille, the Germans were busy establishing administrative law courts.
Of course, even the terror of the Holocaust was framed and fueled by
6
what formalistically passed as law.
With the National Socialist history in mind, the framers of the Basic
Law insisted on a "peace constitution." The preamble declares that in
promulgating a new constitution the Germans were "inspired by the
determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united
Europe."7 Further evidence of the Basic Law's inherent pacifism can be
found in Article 1(2), providing that "the German people
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of
every community, of peace and of justice in the world."8 Article 9(2), one
of the Basic Law's remarkable "militant democracy" provisions, permits
the prohibition of associations whose aims or activities are directed
"against .. .the concept of international understanding." 9 Article 26(1)
renders unconstitutional and obliges the German government to
criminalize "acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the
peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of
aggression."'10 To be sure, there are competing clauses that might be
interpreted as "hints" that German rearmament was inevitable."
However, the Constitutional Court did not get the chance to choose
5. See STEVEN OZMENT, A MIGHTY FORTRESS: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GERMAN

PEOPLE 22 (2004).
6. See, e.g., ABRAHAM J. EDELHEIT & HERSHEL EDELHEIT, HISTORY OF THE
HOLOCAUST: A HANDBOOK AND DICTIONARY 299-331 (1994) (listing, by country and
chronologically, the national socialist legislation passed). But see Gustav Radbruch,
Gesetzliches Unrecht und ibergesetzliches Recht [Statutory Lawlessness and Suprastatutory Law], 1 SUDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG [S. GERMAN L.J.] 105 (1946) (raising
the possibility of "statutory lawlessness" and "supra-statutory law" in reaction to Nazi
'law').
7. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDERESPUBLIxK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic Law] May 23,
1949, pmbl.
8. Id. art. 1, § 2.
9. Id. art. 9, § 2.
10. Id. art. 26, § 1.
11. UWE WESEL, DER GANG NACH KARLSRUHE: DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT IN
DER GESCHICHTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK [THE ROAD TO KARLSRUHE: THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC] 73-75 (2004).
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between these interpretive possibilities. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's
earliest attempt to rearm West Germany was cut short when France
withdrew from plans to create a European Defense Community, thereby
rendering moot the case before the Constitutional Court that raised
these fundamental constitutional questions about Germany's security
2
profile.'
Nonetheless, the strict pacifist elements of the original Basic Law
were soon overshadowed by constitutional amendments pushed through
by Adenauer's super-majority
government
in
1954.13 These
amendments, particularly implicating Article 79(1), paved the way for
West Germany's NATO membership and remilitarization by making it
easier for Germany to commit to international security institutions and
regimes. 14 Yet the constitutional provisions that facilitated Germany's
rearmament did just as much to entrench Germany's post-war reticence
for the use of force. Article 87(a), for example, empowered the newly
formed federal armed forces to defend Germany and to be deployed
"only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law." 15 Thus, even
as Germany rearmed and integrated into the Western security
framework, its constitutional law would dictate and define the function
of the armed forces.
Through the long years of the Cold War a number of social and
political factors combined to cement the consensus that the German
armed forces were to be used exclusively for the purpose of defending
NATO territory. Surely, the ever-present memories of German atrocities
and suffering in the Second World War hardened the pacifist sentiment
evident in the Basic Law and expressed in the defense consensus that
prevailed during the Cold War. Additionally, the constitutional
provision that guarantees the right to object to military service as a
matter of conscience contributed to widespread pacifist sentiment.
12. Id.

13. Id. See also Gesetz zur Ergiinzung des Grundgesetzes [Law for the Amendment of
the Basic Law], Mar. 26, 1954, BGB1. I art. 45a.

14. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 23, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 5707, 243 U.N.T.S. 308. Article 79(1) of the Basic Law
was amended to read: 'This Basic Law may be amended only by a law expressly amending
or supplementing its text. In the case of an international treaty regarding a peace
settlement, the preparation of a peace settlement, or the phasing out of an occupation
regime, or designed to promote the defense of the Federal Republic, it shall be sufficient,
for the purpose of making clear that the provisions of this Basic Law do not preclude the
conclusion and entry into force of the treaty, to add language to the Basic Law that merely
makes this clarification." GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDERESPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG]

[Basic Law] May 23, 1949, art. 79(1), translated by German Bundestag Public Relations
Division (Christian Tomuschat, David P. Currie & Donald P. Kommers trans., 2008).
15. GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDERESPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic Law] May 23,
1949, art. 87a.
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Increasing numbers of young German men sought to avoid conscription
by invoking this provision. 16 To stem this tide the government required
conscientious objectors to appear before local committees to defend their
views. Many Germans' pacifist views were galvanized by these
proceedings. In any case, the zero-sum implications of armed
confrontation along the hot German front of the Cold War made it a
logical imperative that "for over forty years, the [leadership of the
Federal Republic of Germany] interpreted the Basic Law to mean that
German military forces could only be used for defensive purposes on
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) territory."'17 Considering
the Cold War stalemate in Europe, this was as good as saying the
German armed forces might never be deployed.
German reunification, together with the increasing distance in time
since the end of the Second World War, came to pose a rather significant
challenge to the constitutional consensus that Germany's armed forces
could be used only for defense of the NATO territory. Germany's "68er"
Chancellor, Gerhard Schr6der, tactfully but resolutely advocated a
"normal" role for the Federal Republic in world affairs.' 8 This included,
as its chief goal, the ongoing quixotic German pursuit of a permanent
seat on the U.N. Security Council, a body dominated by states possessed
of the military wherewithal to ensure the world's peace and security. 19
Starting in the early 1990s, Germany-to show its willingness to flex its
muscle-increasingly began to deploy its armed forces for purposes
20
other than the defense of German or NATO territory.

16. Id. art. 4, § 3.
17. Walter J. Lemanski, Note, The Reemergence of German Arms: How Far Will
Germany's March Toward Full Use of Military Force Go?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 857,
859 (1996).
18. The term "68er" refers to the generation of Germans who precipitated, participated
in, and grew up in the shadow of the counter-culture student movement that flared into
violent protests in Germany (as elsewhere in the world) in 1968. See 1968 IN EUROPE
(Martin Klimke & Joachim Scharloth eds., 2008); MARTIN KLIMKE, THE OTHER ALLIANCE:
STUDENT PROTEST IN WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL SIXTIES

(2009).
19. See, e.g., Germany Starts U.N. Reform Resolution, DW-WORLD.DE, May 17, 2005,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/O,,1585795,00.html; German U.N. Aspirations Backed
by Europe, DW-WORLD.DE, Sept. 24, 2004, http://www.dw.world.de/dw/article/
0,,1337830,00.html; Germany Seeks U.N. Veto Parity, DW-WORLD.DE, Dec. 12, 2004,
U.N. Reform Targets Security
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/O,,1422951,00.html;
Council, DW-WoRLD.DE, Dec. 2, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/
0,,1413668,00.html.
20. See Georg Nolte, Germany: Ensuring Political Legitimacy for the Use of Military
Forces by Requiring ConstitutionalAccountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 231, 234-35 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K.

Jacobson eds., 2002).
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The first of these ventures involved support of NATO and U.N.
peace-making or humanitarian efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia,
and Serbia-Montenegro. A constitutional challenge to these nondefensive deployments ended with the Constitutional Court handing the
federal government a Pyrrhic victory. In the AWACS I Case from 1994,
21
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the challenged deployments.
However, in doing so it articulated constitutional principles that greatly
constrain Germany's use of force. Decades after the Adenauer
government proposed such an interpretation, the Court held in AWACS
I that Article 24(2) of the Basic Law impliedly authorized the
government to fulfill its obligations under treaties like the U.N. Charter
and the North Atlantic Alliance, including the deployment of armed
forces. 22 Yet the Court went on to hold that any deployment of the
German armed forces for non-defensive purposes requires prior
parliamentary approval. 23 The Court could not point to a clear textual
24
basis for this significant constitutional limitation on the use of force.
Instead, it derived the rule from constitutional history, pointing to the
Weimar-era requirement for a parliamentary declaration of war or
peace. 25 The Court also referred to the Basic Law's assignment of the
military's budget to the parliament. 26 The Court further explained that
the rule existed as an echo of parliament's constitutional prerogative
over treaty making in the first instance, a prerogative that is revived
when obligations under a treaty call for dramatic measures like troop
deployments. 27 The Court concluded by underscoring that the rule
reinforced the ever-fragile balance between almost plenary executive
authority in foreign affairs and the principle of checks and balances
28
inherent in the separation of powers.
In the last decade the Court slightly relaxed this constitutional
limitation on Germany's use of force. 29 In 2001, for example, the Court
turned aside constitutional challenges to the federal government's
21. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 12, 1994,
90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 286 (F.R.G.).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. BVerfGE 90, 286.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar.
12, 2007, 117 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 359 (F.R.G.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGl [Federal Constitutional Court] May 22, 2001, 104
[BVerfGE]
151
(F.R.G.);
Entscheidungen
des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 25, 1999, 100
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 266 (F.R.G.).
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accession to NATO's new, out-of-territory, and non-defensive "strategic
concept."3 0 The radical military implications for Germany's participation
in the new "strategic concept" were obvious. At the time the new
"strategic concept" was announced in 1999, the alliance was executing
its bombing campaign against Serbia, an action that was neither
defensive nor concerned with NATO territory. 31 In spite of the firm
assertion of parliamentary priority in AWACS I, and without regard to
the very evident military implications, the Court was untroubled by the
fact that the federal government had committed Germany to NATO's
new "strategic concept" without consulting the parliament. 32 The Court's
decision in the NATO Strategic Concept Case probably was
foreshadowed by its earlier decision finding nothing constitutionally
objectionable about the deployment of German armed forces in support
of NATO's Kosovo campaign. 33 Later, the Constitutional Court approved
of the parliament's general and open-ended authorization of force
34
deployments in support of NATO's ongoing Afghanistan operation.
With the AWACS II Case, decided in 2008, the Court put an end to
this trend and firmly reasserted the rule from AWACS .35 In spite of his
strident opposition to President George W. Bush's Iraq "adventure,"
Chancellor Schroder nonetheless planned to send German AWACS
planes to Turkey, which summoned NATO backing in anticipation of a
36
flailing, aggressive gesture from Saddam Hussein's threatened regime.
The Chancellor argued that parliamentary approval, consistent with the
rule from AWACS I, was not needed in this instance because the
AWACS aircraft were serving strictly defensive purposes within the
framework of Germany's NATO obligations. 37 The Constitutional Court
disagreed and ruled Schroder's deployment of the aircraft to Turkey a
constitutional violation. 38 It is a mandate of the Basic Law's separation
of powers, the Court firmly reiterated, that the parliament alone has the
39
constitutional authority to decide on deployments to armed conflicts.
This is especially true, the Court explained, in light of the political
dynamics of an alliance system. Germany should not be led into armed
30. BVerfGE 104, 151.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. BVerfGE 100, 266.
34. BVerfGE 117, 359.
35. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 7, 2008,
121 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 135 (F.R.G).
36. See Richard Bernstein, Threats and Responses: The Alliance; Germany Says NATO
Rift Over Turkey Is Near an End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at A14.
37. BVerfGE 121, 135.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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conflict by foreign interests framed as collective security concerns;
deployments must be authorized by the Federation's popularly elected
branch. 40 Significantly, the Court found a parliamentary presumption in
the relevant constitutional framework. When in doubt, the Court
explained, parliament has priority with respect to the deployment of the
German armed forces. 41 This rule, reaffirmed in AWACS II, has led
most scholars to accept that the German armed forces are properly
described as a Parlamentsarmee-a Parliamentary Army. 42 This
presents a very real, systemic constraint on Germany's projection of
force. If anyone doubts this, it is only necessary to recall that Chancellor
Schroder had to package his 2001 Afghanistan troop deployment, meant
to support America's immediate post-9/11 campaign against the
Taliban, with a no-confidence vote. 43 He barely survived-with a mere
two-vote cushion-to see Germany join the American-led Operation
44
Enduring Freedom.
A final, very significant constitutional limitation on Germany's use
of force, which has silently operated to make the preceding discussion of
Constitutional Court jurisprudence possible, is the fact that the Basic
Law clearly gives the Constitutional Court jurisdiction to hear
challenges to the federal government's plans to deploy the armed
forces. 45 The Constitutional Court does not observe a political question
doctrine. 46 Instead, the Court repeatedly has been called upon to judge
the constitutionality of the federal government's security agenda. The
Court in AWACS II emphasized this important feature of the
constitutional regime limiting Germany's use of force by clearly
47
reiterating that these questions are subject to full judicial review.
The Basic Law's regime regarding the use of force, in its substance
but also in the Constitutional Court's clear jurisdiction over such
matters, is both evidence of and an explanation for the German
reticence toward the use of force that often frustrates American

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also Dr. Angela Merkel, Chancellor F.R.G., Germany's Foreign and Security
Policy in the Face of Global Challenges, Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on
Security Policy (Feb. 4, 2006), http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/
rede.php?menu_2006=&menukonferenzen=&sprache=en&id=170&.
43. Steven Erlanger, Pressing Greens, German Leader Wins Historic Vote on Sending
Troops to Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A10.
44. Id.
45. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDERESPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GGI [Basic Law] May 23,

1949, art. 93, § 1, sentence 1.
46. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 44-

45 (1994).
47. BVerfGE 121, 135.
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policymakers. The frustration on the American side of the Atlantic
might be understandable considering that the U.S. Constitution has
posed nothing similar to the German limitations on the executive
branch's discretion to embroil the nation in armed conflict. The texts of
the U.S. Constitution and the Basic Law do not definitively answer the
question of the competence, and limits thereon, to use force. But unlike
the German case, the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution's
assignment of war making authority, at least in practice, has heavily
favored the President, to Congress's disadvantage. Direct attempts by
Congress to "fulfill the intent of the framers . .. and ensure that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to
the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities," have
failed. 48 In the United States the armed forces are anything but a
parliamentary army. And the courts, hiding behind the political
question doctrine, have generally refused to intervene to bring the
President to heel.
More than Kagan's banal "Mars" and "Venus," 49 it is better to note,
especially on the occasion of the Basic Law's sixtieth anniversary, that
distinct constitutional regimes giving force to distinct constitutional
values explain the American and German differences in transatlantic
security policy.
II. CONCLUSION: THE BASIC LAW LAYING REALISM TO REST?
On the occasion of the Basic Law's sixtieth anniversary, perhaps one
might hazard a grander and more normative claim for its use-of-force
regime. More than a mere doctrinal and cultural phenomenon that
explains differences in German and American security policy, is it
possible that the Basic Law's contribution to curbing Germany's
significant militarist tradition provides rare evidence for the hope that
force can be constrained by law?
We know well the realism that dominates U.S. international law
and international relations theory and practice. This realism is,
ironically, largely attributable to the influence of German immigrants
like Hans Kelsen, Leo Strauss, and Hans J. Morgenthau to the United
States. At the core of these theorists' contributions is the
MachiavellianHobbesian worldview that humankind is self-interested

48. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1991). See generally HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRANCONTRA AFFAIR (1990); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL

LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOuIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR
POWER (1995).
49. KAGAN, supranote 1.
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and brutish; might, not law, is what counts. Their views find voice today
in the United States through the neo-conservative commentary and
policy positions of the already-mentioned Robert Kagan, as well as
through Michael Glennon, Eric Posner, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, John
Bellinger, Josh Bolton, and Paul Wolfowitz. Perhaps the experiences of
the last half-decade have adequately cast their fundamentalist and
formalistic realism into doubt. But the narrative offered in this essay
provides its own, perhaps deeper, repudiation. When it comes to force,
the law is far from dead. ° To the contrary, the Basic Law has made the
use of force in Germany almost exclusively a question of democracy and
law. The Basic Law has given Germany a new kind of army, unraveling
a bellicose German militarism with roots in Tacitus' era (and earlier)
and that resonated across the centuries as "an
important part of the
51
self-understanding of the majority of Germans."
Joachim Kappner recently noted that postwar Germany seized, "for
the first time in the country's history, the chance to reconcile the
German military with German democracy." 52 This, Kappner concluded,
"is one of the great success stories of the Federal Republic."53 If this is
so, and if the world is lucky and wise enough to learn from this
remarkable German example, then this reconciliation of military and
democracy will have to count equally as one of the great successes of the
German Basic Law. That would be good reason indeed to celebrate the
Bonner Grundgesetz.

50. See Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFF., May-June
2003, at 16, 16-36.
51. Kurt Kister, Der zivile Reserveoffizier [Civilian Reserve Officer], SUDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, (F.R.G.), May 4, 2009, available at http://www.sueddeutsche.delpolitikl
706/467280/text.
52. Joachim Kippner, Der alte Geist zog nicht mehr ein [The Old Spirit Is No Longer
Moved],
SUDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG
(F.R.G.),
May
4,
2009,
available at
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/658/467233/textl.
53. Id.

